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National and state homeland security strategies call for continuity of operations 
plan development.  The 2006 Nationwide Plan Review Phase II Report identifies 
continuity of operations plan development as a state and local goal with a federal goal of 
providing continuity of operations plan development support.  Most local governments do 
not have a continuity of operation plan or it needs to be updated.  Continuity of 
operations plan guidance is provided by a variety of international, federal, state and local 
documents.  Common, unique and best practice elements are identified and should be 
contained in a continuity of operations plan.  An identified compilation of continuity of 
operation elements is presented.  Planning templates are good for COOP document 
structure and should contain the compilation of COOP elements, recommended template 
is offered.  Local government continuity of operations plan developers must 
independently develop and “own” their continuity of operations plan based on the 
compilation COOP elements.  An after action-report is a necessary component for 
continuity of operations plan maintenance and can be used for continuity of operations 
plan research.  Academia must pursue continuity of operations plan research to 
qualitatively and quantitatively identify effective continuity of operations plans and their 
respective elements.  With the advent of homeland security as an academic pursuit, 
research opportunity exists and should be supported by the federal government because 
of the critical nature of an effective COOP for local government in ensuring the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A continuity of operations plan (COOP) facilitates the performance of essential 
functions during an emergency situation that disrupts normal operations, and it provides 
for the resumption of normal operations once the emergency has ended.  National and 
state homeland security strategies call for COOP development.  The 2006 Nationwide 
Plan Review Phase 2 Report identifies COOP development as a state and local goal with 
a federal goal of providing COOP development support.1  Currently, COOP guidance is 
provided in a variety of international, federal, state and local documents.  Common, 
unique and best practice COOP elements are identified through a literature review.  A 
compilation of COOP elements are identified.  The development of a local government 
continuity of operations plan should build upon the identified compilation of COOP 
elements.  A COOP template is recommended and provides structure and format for the 
identified compilation of COOP elements.  By incorporating the same identified COOP 
elements, continuity of operation plans would be similar and fuse with other local 
continuity of operation plans within the state or region.  This thesis identifies the 
following elements for the development of a continuity of operations plan:  
• Purpose/Objective; 
• Continuity of Government 
• Applicability and Scope; 
• Authorities and References; 
• COOP Implementation Plan (mitigation, preparedness, activation, 
devolution, response, recovery/reconstitution; 
• Classification of Emergencies and COOP Responses; 
• Delegation of Authority to Key Personnel; 
• Orders of Succession for Key Personnel; 
• Incident Command System; 
• Identification of Essential Functions and Critical Services; 
• Alternate Operating Locations and Facilities, to include drive-away kits; 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 13-14. 
 xviii
• Interoperable Communications; 
• Vital Records, Databases, and Systems; 
• Financial Management; 
• Security Measures for Personnel, Records and Alternate Facilities or 
Protection of Government Resources; 
• Staff/Dependent Care Plans to Include Personal Preparedness 
Transportation, Lodging and Food; 
• Photographs, Charts, Roster and Maps; 
• Tests, Training, and Exercise; 
• Plan Management/Maintenance to Include After-Action Reports. 
This compilation of COOP elements can become part of the 2006 Nationwide 
Plan Review Phase 2 Report federal government’s desired outcome for Goal #24: 
“creation of a performance management framework that tracks performance against 
standard capabilities and tasks as reflected in synchronized plans across levels of 
government to include continuity of operations and government as a priority performance 
measure.”2 
An after action-report of COOP activation is a necessary component for COOP 
maintenance and can be used for COOP research.  COOP development and academic 
research regarding the effectiveness for existing plans is non existent.  COOP guidance is 
being driven by government documents and lessons learned from government after-action 
reports.  Independent research and review is necessary to strengthen government’s 
direction in COOP development.  Note that COOP guidance documents are relatively 
recent, circa 2002-2006.  Academia must pursue COOP research too qualitatively and 
quantitatively, dependent on the appropriate research method as determined by the 
researcher, identify effective COOPs and their respective elements.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 78. 
1 
I. A COMPILATION OF NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN  




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
National and state homeland security strategic plans call for local involvement.  
Many state homeland security strategic plans call for the continuity of government 
operations, including local government.  A continuity of operations plan (COOP) 
facilitates the performance of essential functions during an emergency situation that 
disrupts normal operations, and it provides for the resumption of normal operations once 
the emergency has ended.  National and state homeland security strategies call for COOP 
development.  Most local governments do not have a continuity of operation plan or it 
needs to be updated.   
On June 16, 2006 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with 
the U.S. Department of Transportation released the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 
Report.  The report advised that most emergency operation plans do not reflect sufficient 
COOP or COG planning.4  A desired outcome for the federal government in the 
Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report is the creation of a performance management 
framework that tracks performance against standard capabilities and tasks as reflected in 
synchronized plans across levels of government.  Continuity of operations and 
government should be included as a priority performance measure.5 
It is important to note continuity of operations planning rose to prominence after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The early COOP guidance documents were 
available in 2002.  Since 2002, the available COOP guidance documents have built off of 
                                                 
3 Publilius Syrus, "Quotation #24383 Classic Quotes," The Quotations Page, ~100 BC, 
htt;:\\www.quotationspage.com/quote/24383.html. (accessed July 10, 2006). 
4 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 11. 
5 Ibid, 78. 
2 
each other and COOP elements have been added by various federal, state and local 
jurisdictions.  Since four years have passed, it is time for these documents to be reviewed 
and updated, to include a comprehensive compilation of COOP elements. 
A COOP must be written and available for all government jurisdictions.  Further, 
a compilation of COOP elements should be applied by local government officials in 
COOP development.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the necessary elements of a COOP for local government?  By 
identifying these COOP elements from different international, federal, state and the 
limited existing local COOPs guidance documents, a compilation of COOP elements can 
be used to develop a local COOP thereby producing similar plans that can be activated 
for single or multi jurisdictional all hazard events? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
A close review of seventeen international, federal, state and local COOP guidance 
documents will be conducted to identify a compilation of COOP elements.  All 
documents reviewed will be circa 2002-2005.  International, federal, state and local 
elements will be listed and collated.  The identified compilation of COOP elements can 
then be used to develop a local government COOP.  The identified compilation of COOP 
elements will be a policy recommendation to federal, state and local government for 
COOP development.  
D. COMPILATION OF COOP ELEMENTS VERSUS A COOP TEMPLATE 
This thesis delineates a difference between a COOP element compilation, and a 
COOP template.  The compilation identifies the necessary COOP elements that should be 
included in a local COOP.  A COOP template is utilizing the elements in a suggested 
structure and format given to the COOP.  The identified compilation of COOP elements 
can be placed in a variety of ways or order in COOP templates.  Templates can vary in 
document structure and format from federal, state and local government however the 
identified compilation of COOP elements should be contained in all COOP templates and 
not vary.  The compilation of COOP elements should be applied locally.  The author also 
believes the compilation could be utilized by federal and state government as well.  Quite 
3 
simply, the identified COOP elements are what should be in the COOP template which 
provides the document structure and format to the COOP. 
E. COMMON, UNIQUE AND BEST PRACTICE COOP ELEMENTS 
Common COOP elements will be those elements consistently found throughout 
the seventeen COOP guidance documents and templates.  Using the same seventeen 
documents and templates, elements contained in an individual or a few of the documents 
will be considered unique.  In addition, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) has 
distinguished a best practice of COOP elements.  The LLIS best practice will be 
compared against the common and unique COOP elements.  The common, unique and 
best practice COOP elements will drive the identified compilation of COOP elements for 
policy recommendation.    
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The development of a local government continuity of operations plan should build 
upon a compilation of COOP elements.  By identifying necessary and common 
components from the comparison of multiple international, federal, state and limited local 
guidelines, a common flavor can be incorporated into COOP development.  The 
identified compilation of COOP elements can be developed in developing a COOP for 
local jurisdictions.  By incorporating the same identified compilation of COOP elements, 
continuity of operation plans would be similar and fuse with other local continuity of 
operation plans within the state or region.  As a result, part of the federal government’s 
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5 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF COOP DEVELOPMENT FOR 
LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 
A. THE NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT 
On June 16, 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with 
the U.S. Department of Transportation released the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 
Report.  The report advised that most emergency operation plans do not reflect sufficient 
COOP or COG planning.      
The results of Basic Plan reviews reveal several areas of concern.  A significant 
number of States (59%) and urban areas (65%) do not have a concept of operations in 
place that is judged to be sufficient for a catastrophic event.  Formal plans that describe 
the general sequence of actions, supported by checklists that describe detailed actions for 
different threats and hazards, are vital in catastrophic incidents when multi-agency 
coordination reaches national proportions.  The impact of this area of concern is 
magnified when the lack of sufficient continuity of operations/continuity of government 
plans (COOP/COG) is considered.  Longstanding planning guidance, such as FEMA’s 
State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning 
and voluntary standards (such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity, explicitly 
identifies requirements for continuity measures to maintain operations in the face of 
disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of 
critical services.6   
While more States than urban areas (41% versus 27%) have sufficient 
COOP/COG plans, disruption of incident management and emergency services is still a 
concern in those states and urban areas that were rated Partially Sufficient or Not 
Sufficient and are currently working on updating, publishing, training, and exercising to 
address critical aspects of COOP/COG planning.  Critical aspects of updated COOP/COG 
plans should include clear lines of succession for key management positions; protection 
of essential records, facilities, equipment, and personnel; operation of alternate facilities; 
and functioning of emergency communications.  Planning assumptions in Basic Plans                                                  
6 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 13-14. 
6 
vary widely across state and urban area plans.  With the exception of hurricane-prone 
states and urban areas, planning assumptions reflect a consistent trend of discounting the 
likelihood of catastrophic event.  Plans and exercises often reflect a narrow perception of 
risk and are usually scaled to familiar events instead of the “breaking point” conditions 
associated with catastrophic incidents.7 
The Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report delineated areas of strength and 
weakness.  Areas of strength are: the majority of participants are in the process of 
strengthening continuity plans, most jurisdictions have adequately referenced legal 
authorities in the Basic Plan, most Review participants have identified their most 
significant threats and hazards and their plans follow all-hazards planning principles.8  
“The areas of weakness are: existing Federal guidance is outdated and provides unclear 
direction in regards to improving Basic Plans, most EOPs do not reflect Sufficient COOP 
or COG planning, most EOPs have been exercised or used in actual emergencies but few 
address the impact of a catastrophic incident, many Review participants lack a formalized 
corrective action and improvement process, although relevant legal authorities are 
referenced in Basic Plans, some aspects of mutual aid agreements are unclear (for 
example, arrest powers are not well-defined for law enforcement officers responding to a 
mutual aid request), for states and territories on the nation’s borders mutual aid 
agreements with foreign entities need to be coordinated more thoroughly with the Federal 
Government, with the exception of states and urban areas vulnerable to hurricanes most 
Review participants do not consider catastrophic incidents a likely occurrence.”9  
All organizations tasked in a Basic Plan should ensure that lines of succession for 
key management positions are established; essential records, facilities, and equipment are 
protected; where possible, alternate operating locations are available; emergency 
response staff is protected; and functioning of emergency communications is assured.10  
The Initial Conclusions For the Federal Government In Ongoing and Near-Term Efforts 
lists performance management frameworks to support the National Preparedness Goal 
                                                 
7 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 13-14. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 64. 
7 
should measure the ability to: integrate a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response 
based on the intersection of tasks and capabilities in combined plans; and maintain 
operations in the face of disruptions of service damage to the environment in which 
operations occur or loss of critical resources.11  Continuity of operations and government 
was observed to be general weaknesses.  A desired outcome is the creation of a 
performance management framework that tracks performance against standard 
capabilities and tasks as reflected in synchronized plans across levels of government, 
continuity of operations and government should be included as a priority performance 
measure.12 
B. WHY A LOCAL COOP IS NECESSARY–THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT EXAMPLE 
The New Orleans Police Department serves as an example of why a known 
effective COOP is necessary.  In the summer of 2005 the United States Gulf Coast was 
hit by Hurricane Katrina.  New Orleans was dramatically impacted by Katrina.  The New 
Orleans Police Department had not taken basic steps to protect its resources and ensure 
continuity of operations.13  For example, communications nodes, evidence rooms, and 
even emergency generators were housed in lower floors susceptible to flooding.  When 
the levees broke and the floodwaters overtook police headquarters and district offices, the 
department lost its command and control and communications functions.  Police vehicles 
believed to be moved out of harm’s way were lost to the floodwaters.  Hundreds of New 
Orleans Police Department officers went missing — some for legitimate reasons and 
some not — at a time they were needed most.  This left the city unable to provide enough 
personnel and other resources to maintain law and order at shelters and on the streets.   
There was no unified command or clear priorities within the department.14  Even when 
police were present to restore law and order, they did not have the resources to arrest, 
book, and detain suspects.15  
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 78. 
12 Ibid. 
13 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and the Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 256. 
14 Ibid, 241. 
15 Ibid, 246. 
8 
Despite the well-known threat from flooding, the New Orleans Police Department 
had not taken some basic steps to protect its resources and ensure continuity of 
operations.16  In 2004, the police department reportedly produced an “elaborate hurricane 
plan” which was issued to all commanders.17  But, according to a reporter who was 
present during Katrina and reviewed police operations, it “stayed on their bookshelves,” 
and the department never ran “exercises to familiarize officers with the plan.”  Few 
officers the reporter spoke with even knew the plan existed.18  This information was 
presented to the U.S. House of Representatives in A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of 
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and the Response to 
Hurricane Katrina. 
C. A LOCAL EFFECTIVE COOP — THE VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA 
Florida is noted for its hurricane season.  Because of this natural event, Florida 
has become well versed and exercised in COOP.  2004 was a hurricane season for the 
record books, with four hurricanes striking Florida, three of which significantly impacted 
Volusia County and its municipalities.19  Hurricanes Charlie, Frances and Jeanne each 
necessitated the full emergency response and disaster recovery operations from the local 
jurisdictions.  Overall, the three hurricanes of 2004 were a remarkable and unprecedented 
opportunity for Volusia County and its municipalities to measure the effectiveness of 
their response and recovery efforts, and their ability to work together as a team.  The 
Volusia County 2004 Hurricane Season After-action Report showed than an interesting 
aspect reported by nearly everyone interviewed for the evaluation was that effectiveness 
and efficiency of emergency operations improved with each storm.20   
The Valusia County after action report identified a number of lessons learned or 
areas of improvement directly related to their local COOP, they were: 
                                                 
16 U.S. House of Representatives, Failure of Initiative, 245. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Volusia County, Florida, 2004 Hurricane Season "After Action Report" Lessons Learned Regarding 
Improved County and Municipal Hurricane Emergency Preparedness (Princeton, NJ: Emergency Response 
Planning & Management, Inc, 2005), 2. 
20 Ibid, 3. 
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• Expand Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) -  For several 
jurisdictions and organizations, the 2004 hurricane season was a challenge 
to maintain operations in spite of post-impact conditions, and specifically 
the protracted loss of power and telephone communications.  In some 
cases, a COOP-type response had to be implemented “on the spot,” and 
many organizations would have benefited if a COOP had been in place. 
• Define COOP priority needs on a countywide basis - Given the number of 
jurisdictions and organizations in the county, an expanded COOP program 
would require significant time, effort, and resources.  Therefore, it would 
be desirable to prioritize the effort, allowing it to be extended over several 
years, by using a consistent approach to identify COOP planning needs. 
• Provide a COOP planning educational/training program - While the State 
of Florida is currently offering grant funding for local government COOP 
planning, it is not likely to be adequate to address all of the priority needed 
identified.  It would be beneficial to provide education/training to 
municipal officials that would allow them to develop COOPS 
independently, while nevertheless using a format and approach that would 
result in consistent operational concepts on a countywide basis. 
Evaluate current COOP’s regarding power and communications loss - The 2004 
season indicated that protracted power and communications losses could be formidable 
challenges to agency and jurisdiction operations.  The COOP’s that have been and are 
being prepared should be specifically evaluated, and modified if indicated, regarding 
these vulnerabilities.21 
D. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE WITH AND WITHOUT A COOP 
The importance of COOP planning is illustrated by the City of New York’s 
experience following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001—an incident that severely tested the city’s ability to continue providing essential 
                                                 
21 Volusia County, Florida, 2004 Hurricane Season, 6. 
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services and respond to the disaster that had befallen it.  At the time of the attack New 
York City did not have a COOP plan.22   
The city’s new Emergency Operations Center located at No. 7 World Trade 
Center was destroyed when the building collapsed on the afternoon of the attack. In 
addition, disruption of utilities and telecommunications capabilities rendered the City 
Hall and the city’s Federal Center unusable.  The city government and the local offices of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Environmental Protection Agency had 
to find and equip alternate facilities to continue operations and contribute to the 
emergency response.23 
In the absence of a COOP plan, it took almost three days to procure, adapt, and 
equip a suitable alternate facility to support the performance of essential functions for 
first responders.  The city identified an empty warehouse space at Pier 92 on the Hudson 
River, rushing to add interior partitions along with power and telecommunications wiring 
and bringing in equipment, furnishings, and supplies.  On September 14, the Pier began 
functioning as the city’s EOC, Joint Information Center, and alternate seat of 
government, providing a base for the Mayor and other key officials.  Representatives 
from more than 150 city, state, federal, and private organizations operated in the EOC as 
the city’s Office of Emergency Management worked to ensure continuity of operations 
and recovery in downtown Manhattan.24   
While no one would question the heroic efforts of New York City’s personnel in 
responding to the World Trade Center disaster, the existence of a COOP plan and a pre 
designated and prepared alternate facility could only have made those efforts even more 
effective.25    
                                                 
22 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Interim Guidance on Continuity of Operations Planning 
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Subsequently, New York City developed a COOP after September 11, 2001 and 
was faced with its first COOP challenge when its citizens rose to the extraordinary 
challenges presented by the August 14, 2003 power outage and, as a result, have a lot of 
which to be proud.  Much of what went well during this outage was the result of lessons 
learned and precautions taken following previous disasters and crises, most notably 
September 11, 2001, as well as planning for Y2K and the threatened transit strike.  
Compared to 2001, and reflecting extensive public outreach, in 2003 more New Yorkers 
are better equipped to deal with emergency situations.  Institutions in both the public and 
private sectors have developed more complete COOP and business continuity plans, 
including installing backup power and distributing emergency kits to employees.26 
The after action assessment resulted in thirty-five recommendations.  Because 
every emergency event is unique and often requires moment-by-moment decision-
making, the Task Force recommendations endorse flexible protocols that encourage 
cooperation between the public and private sectors and leverage both public and private 
resources.27  According to the New York City Emergency Response Task force chaired 
by Andrew Alper and Susan L. Kupferman, the following recommendations involve 
COOP development and are a subset of the thirty-five recommendations listed in the after 
action assessment: 
• Strengthen self-activating emergency plans for essential staff; 
• Develop a hardened citywide communications infrastructure that has the 
capacity to survive public infrastructure failures; 
• Develop an emergency resources database; 
• Conduct a backup power survey and develop a backup power installation 
plan; 
• Enhance the City’s emergency fuel management plan; 
• Ensure City agencies have evacuation plans and drill regularly on plans; 
                                                 
26 Wachtendorf and Wachtendorf, Elements of Community Resilience, 4. 
27 New York City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City's Emergency 
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• Develop guidance on emergency kits for the workplace; 
• Review emergency dispatch and communications operations to improve 
the capacity for coordinated dispatch, and incident command and 
management.28 
                                                 
28 New York City Emergency Response Task Force, New York City’s Preparedness, 16-19. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CONTINUITY OF OPERATION PLANS, AN OVERVIEW 
The purpose of a COOP is to provide a local jurisdiction with guidance that will 
direct essential services effectively in the event the capability to perform essential 
services are in jeopardy of being lost or are lost and in a timely manner during an all 
hazard event and it provides for the resumption of normal operations once the emergency 
has ended.  An all hazards approach can consist of natural events such as a tornado, 
flooding or blizzard; an infrastructure failure such as an electrical outage, contaminated 
water supply or communication failure; a terrorist/criminal event such as a CBRN event;  
a pandemic; and finally a regional event that overwhelms resources that would require 
the local jurisdiction to provide aid to surrounding jurisdictions to include the loss of 
personnel to keep essential services operational.   
Local government has a fundamental responsibility to provide uninterrupted 
essential services to the public regardless of circumstances.  COOP planning is simply a 
“good business practice”—part of the fundamental mission as a responsible and reliable 
public institution.29  Without well developed COOP planning, local government risks 
leaving their citizens without vital services in what could be their time of greatest need.  
COOP planning is applicable to an all hazards approach including natural disasters, 
accidents, technological failures, work place violence, and emergencies related to foreign 
or domestic acts of aggression.   
Most local government strives to be prepared, to the greatest extent possible, to 
respond to all hazard disasters and emergencies within their jurisdiction to save lives; 
protect the public health, safety, and well being; protect property; maintain public order; 
and restore basic police services.  The extent to which disasters and emergencies can 
interrupt, paralyze, disrupt, and/or destroy our capabilities to preserve civil government 
institutions and perform essential government functions effectively under emergency 
conditions can vary.  Consequently, it is imperative local government develop and 
maintain a COOP.  The COOP is designed to develop and maintain a plan that enables 
                                                 
29 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Guidance for 
Local Government (Columbus, Ohio: State of Ohio, 2005), ii. 
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local government to preserve, maintain, and/or reconstitute its capability to function 
effectively in the event of the threat or occurrence of any disaster or emergency that 
could potentially disrupt local government operations and services.   
The review of existing literature shows federal and state guidance, circa 2002-
2005, for COOP development for local government.  There is also international guidance 
from Canada and Australia.  Private enterprise also weighs in but uses the federal and 
state guidance as a base for their literature.  Access to actual local government COOP 
documents is limited due to the confidential nature of their content.  In fact, local COOPs 
in Florida are protected from public records requests and are for authorized personnel 
only which limited the author’s access to completed Florida COOPs.   The following 
literature review focuses on documents categorized by international, national and private, 
state, and local sources. 
An interesting aspect of the literary research process showed a remarkable lack of 
academic literature.  Academic journal articles regarding government COOP 
development and academic research regarding the effectiveness for existing COOPS is 
practically non existent.  It would appear academia regards COOP development and 
effectiveness as too much within the operational arm of government rather than an 
academic opportunity to research what makes a COOP effective.  COOP guidance is 
being driven by intuitive management, government documents and lessons learned from 
government after-action reports. 
B. INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
1. Australia 
The Commonwealth of Australia has a process for developing an overall 
emergency operations plan that includes continuity of operations.  Australia integrates 
continuity of operations within its emergency operations plan.  Australia offers the 
following planning steps: create a planning committee, emergency risk management, 
identify responsibilities, identify resources and services required, develop emergency 
management arrangements and systems, document the plan and monitor and review the 
plan.30  The emergency planning process is designed to produce a set of arrangements 
                                                 
30 Commonwealth of Australia, Emergency Planning Manual Number 43 (Dickson ACT: Australian 
Government Attorney-General's Department, 2004), 10. 
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that will provide the basis for managing emergency impacts.31  Australia has identified 
elements that should be contained in a COOP, which are collated later in this thesis.   
2. Canada 
Canada offers guidance on a municipal emergency plan and a business continuity 
plan.  The Canadian Municipal Emergency Plan is closely associated with the U.S. 
emergency operations plan (EOP) standard while the Canadian Business Continuity Plan 
is more closely associated with the U.S. COOP model.  However, it should be noted that 
many of the concepts and elements of each of these plans cross over and/or closely 
integrate the plans with each other.   
The Canadian Business Continuity Plan calls for an emergency management 
team, emergency operations center (both primary and alternate), scope and objectives, 
business function (the U.S. equivalent of an essential function), exercise log and 
document revision history.32  The same document calls for a recovery procedure, 
recovery time objective, recovery location, recovery steps, dependencies and other 
considerations.33  Some business functions to consider are vital records, equipment and 
office supplies needed, facilities required, and people and/or services required.34  The 
Canadian business continuity plan offers a template to follow.  Canada has identified 
elements that should be contained in a COOP which are collated later in this document. 
C. FEDERAL DOCUMENTS 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the development of 
continuity of operation plans for all departments and agencies.35  State and local levels of 
government have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the 
emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack.  Local units are 
the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene.  All disasters are ultimately local 
events.36  Therefore, local jurisdictions must develop COOPs.   
                                                 
31 Australia Natural Disasters Organisation, Community Emergency Planning Guide Second Edition 
(Queanbeyan NSW: Natural Disasters Organisation, 1992), 10. 
32 Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness, Business Continuity Plan (Toronto: Canadian 
Government, 2000), 1-14. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, 32. 
36 Ibid, 1-14. 
16 
Eric Petersen for the Congressional Research Center defines COOP planning as a 
segment of federal government contingency planning that refers to the internal effort of 
an organization, such as a branch of government, department, or office, to assure that the 
capability exists to continue essential operations in the aftermath of a comprehensive 
array of potential operational interruptions.  COOP planning is critical because much of 
the recovery from an incident, which might include the maintenance of civil authority, 
and infrastructure repair, among other recovery activities, presumes the existence of an 
ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee actions taken.  Effective 
COOP planning must provide, in advance of an incident, a variety of means to assure 
contingent operations.37 
In addition, in a report to Congress regarding COOP planning, Eric Petersen 
reported that the COOP could outline the process the agency will follow to designate 
essential functions and resources, define short and long-term COOP goals and objectives, 
forecast budgetary requirements, anticipate and address issues and potential obstacles, 
and establish planning milestones.  A completed COOP plan would likely incorporate 
several elements, including: identification of an agency’s essential functions which must 
continue under all circumstances; stipulation of agency lines of succession and delegation 
of authorities; provisions for the use of alternate facilities; establishment of emergency 
operating procedures; establishment of reliable, interoperable communications; 
provisions for the safekeeping of vital records and databases; provisions for logistical 
support; personnel issues; security measures for personnel, records and alternate 
facilities; and development of exercises and training programs to assure the effectiveness 
of COOP planning.38 
According to private enterprise author Chris Alvord, per federal current guidance, 
viable COOP capability must take maximum advantage of existing agency field 
infrastructures.39  At minimum, the plan should delineate essential functions and 
activities: outline decision process for determining appropriate actions in implementing 
                                                 
37 Eric R. Petersen, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Background and 
Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003), 1-15. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Chris Alvord, Federal Agencies Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) Guidelines (Reston: 
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COOP plans and procedures; establish a roster of fully equipped and trained emergency 
personnel with authority to perform essential functions and activities; include procedures 
for employee advisories, alerts, and COOP plan activation, with instructions for 
relocation to pre-designated facilities, with and without warning, during duty and non-
duty hours; provide for personnel accountability throughout duration of emergency; 
provide for attaining operational capability within 12 hours; and establish reliable 
processes and procedures to acquire resources necessary to continue essential functions, 
sustain operations up to 30 days.40  Alvord also asserts continuity objectives should 
include: ensuring continuous performance of agency’s essential functions/operations 
during emergency; protecting essential facilities, equipment, records, assets; reducing or 
mitigating disruptions to operations; reducing loss of life, minimizing damage and losses; 
and achieving timely and orderly recovery from emergency and resumption of full 
service to customers.41 
Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65 provides guidance to Federal executive 
branch department and agencies for the development of viable and executable 
contingency plans for the continuity of operations.  FPC 65 is the flagship of Federal 
COOP guidance and was released in 2004.  FPC 65 encompasses all levels of Federal 
Executive Branch departments, agencies, and independent organizations.  According to 
FPC 65 the objectives of a COOP are to ensure the continuous performance of an 
agency’s essential functions/operations during an emergency; protect essential facilities, 
equipment, records, and other assets; reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations; reduce 
loss of life, minimize damage and losses; and achieve a timely and orderly recovery from 
an emergency and resumption of full service to customers.  FPC 65 directs all agency 
COOP capabilities to encompass the following elements: plans and procedures; 
identification of essential elements; delegations of authority; orders of succession; 
alternate facilities; interoperable communications; vital records and databases; and tests, 
training, and exercises.  Further, FPC 65 suggests a time-phased approach for three 
phases defined under a COOP.  The three phases include: Phase One—Activation and  
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Relocation (0-12 hours); Phase Two—Alternate Facility Operations (12 hours – 
termination); and Phase Three—Reconstitution (termination and return to normal 
operations).42 
Dr. Jim Kennedy, who is a private enterprise author, states a COOP program 
consists of seven phases: project initiation; identification of functional requirements - 
mission impact analysis, risk assessment and mitigation strategies and plan; plan design 
and development; COOP program implementation; training, testing and drills; COOP 
revision and updating; COOP execution.43  Dr. Kennedy also advised that at minimum 
each governmental operation needs to ask and answer the following questions.  What are 
the operation’s essential function and key personnel?  How can the operation’s facilities, 
vital records, equipment, and other critical assets be protected?  How can disruption to 
the agency’s or department’s operations be reduced?  How can damages and loss of life 
be minimized?  Is it possible through proper planning to achieve timely and orderly 
recovery from an emergency to full service to the services users?44 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has built COOP 
development guidance from FPC 65.  Before the mid-1990s, governments and the public 
were primarily concerned with the impacts of natural and accidental technological 
disasters.  Since that time, our nation has been forced to acknowledge and plan for the 
devastating consequences of intentional acts of destruction, such as the June 1993 
bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center, the April 1995 bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the September 2001 airline attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon, and the September/October 2001 mailings of anthrax 
to targets along the East Coast.  FEMA’s Interim Guidance on Continuity of Operations 
Planning for State and Local Governments is designed to help state and local 
governments/jurisdictions develop COOPs tailored to the characteristics of their 
individual organizations and the essential functions they perform.  The guidance 
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promotes a step-based approach to COOP planning.45  The following are the FEMA steps 
in COOP development: Step 1, COOP planners initiate the planning process by studying 
and documenting the background factors that will influence how the organization 
prepares for COOP; Step 2, planners engage in the important task of identifying and 
documenting the organization’s essential operations, functions, and responsibilities; Step 
3, planners develop the basic plan for COOP, they outline provisions to ensure continuity 
of governmental authority and the order of succession for key positions; identify the key 
personnel to perform essential functions in an emergency; develop strategies for 
protecting vital records, databases, systems, and equipment; and identify, evaluate, and 
select the alternate facilities to be used for the organization’s emergency operations; Step 
4, procedures are developed to ensure appropriate and timely execution of the COOP plan 
during an emergency; and Step 5, planners address measures to ensure that the 
organization maintains its readiness for COOP.46 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) offers a number of documents designed to assist in COOP development.  
Agencies within local government that require COOP plans are: law enforcement, fire, 
911 emergency dispatch, public works, emergency medical services, emergency 
management, utilities, departments of health/public health, executive/elected offices.47  
LLIS advises local jurisdictions should develop a COOP that include key elements such 
as the identification of essential functions, delegation of authorities, order of succession, 
protection of vital documents and systems, alternate operating locations, communications 
plans, and a plan for tests, training, and exercises.48  LLIS offers documents on 
developing each of these key COOP elements.  Although templates are useful for 
mapping out the COOP plan, many continuity planners recommend against relying too  
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heavily on outlines, worksheets, and templates.  It is important for the jurisdiction and 
agencies to “own” the COOP process by participating in the actual planning and 
development of the plan.49 
D. STATE DOCUMENTS 
A number of states offer guidance in COOP development for local jurisdictions.  
Much of the guidance is based on federal documents previously discussed or the 
emulation of another states’ COOP guidance.  Some of the states include specific COOP 
elements unique to that state.  California, Maryland, Florida, Wisconsin and Ohio provide 
guidance for COOP development.  The COOP guidance documents from these states 
have been reviewed.  Florida was an early developer of COOP guidance, 2002.  In 
addition, Florida has developed and activated local COOPS during its hurricane season in 
recent years.  In fact, four hurricanes hit Florida in 2004.  California and Wisconsin was 
reviewed because their COOP guidance was developed in 2003.  In addition, California 
has experienced eighteen major disasters since 1989.50  Maryland’s guidance was 
developed in 2004 and Ohio in 2005.  Lastly, Maryland and Florida were cited and listed 
in the federal documents previously reviewed.  A progression of state COOP element 
development can be obtained from these documents.    
1. California 
According to California, continuity of operations is a federal planning concept 
that focuses on government’s ability to continue essential functions.51  California has 
relied on a variety of documents, such as business continuity or business resumption 
plans, to accomplish many of the same planning objectives as those of COG and COOP.  
To maintain consistency among federal, state, and local plans, California proposes that all 
levels of California government develop an integrated “continuity of government 
operations” capability, which is a consolidation of all the planning elements included in 
COG and COOP.52  California proposes the following COOP/COG elements: emergency 
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concepts, actions and procedures provided in emergency plans and emergency action 
plans; identification and prioritization of essential functions; line of succession to 
essential positions required in an emergency; delegation of authority and pre-delegation 
of emergency authorities to key officials; emergency operations centers, alternate (work-
site) facilities and alternate emergency operations centers; interoperable communications; 
protection of government resources, facilities and personnel; safeguarding of vital records 
and databases; tests, training and exercises.53 
2. Maryland 
According to the State of Maryland, when devising a COOP, an agency must 
consider the assumptions underlying the plan.  These assumptions include what threats 
will affect an agency’s ability to carry out its mission; the expected impact on the agency 
for each potential threat; the probability that each potential threat will occur; whether 
personnel or resources from other federal and/or state agencies, municipalities, or 
organizations not affected will be available; that the agency will implement a plan within 
twelve hours after the event; and that the plan will provide for the ability to continue 
operations for at least fourteen days after the emergency.  The key purpose of COOP 
planning is to reduce the consequences of a disaster to an acceptable level.54  Although 
when and how a disaster will occur is not known, the fact that future disasters will 
happen is certain.  The following table lists the many potential threats that could activate 
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           Intentional Unintentional  
• Tornados  
• High Winds  
• Electrical Storms  
• Ice Storms  
• Snowstorms and  
Blizzards  
• Floods  
• Earthquakes  
• Epidemics  
• Major Landslides  
• Hurricanes and  
Typhoons  
• Tropical Storms  
• Wildfires  
• Droughts  
• Misuse of Resources  
• Security Breaches  
• Theft  
• Fraud/Embezzlement  
• Fire/Arson  
• Vandalism  
• Sabotage: External and 
Internal Actors  
• Workplace Violence  
• Bomb Threats  
• Bioterrorism  
• Physical Terrorist Assaults  
• Labor Disputes/Strikes  
• Disruption of Supply 
Sources  
• Transportation System 
Disruption or Shutdown  
• Riot/Civil Disorder/War  
• Voice & Data Telecommunications Failures or 
Malfunctions  
• Software/Hardware Failures or Malfunctions  
• Unavailability of Key Personnel  
• Human Errors  
• Power Outages: External or Internal  
• Water Outages  
• Gas Outages  
• HVAC System Failures or  
Malfunctions  
• Accidental Damage to or Destruction of Physical 
Facilities 
Table 1. Maryland Potential Threats 
 
How well (or poorly) a COOP plan is designed and implemented will determine 
response, resumption, recovery, and restoration.56  The State of Maryland Emergency 
Management Agency has identified basic elements of a COOP: essential functions and 
key personnel such as the delegation of authority and order of succession; vital records, 
systems and equipment; alternate work site(s) / relocation; and communications.57  The 
State of Maryland recognizes that often while devising a plan to cover one of these 
elements, ideas may arise which will change or augment the plan for another element.58    
3. Florida 
Florida has been identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as 
being the top state in the nation for emergency preparedness.  Florida was an early leader 
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in COOP development, document circa 2002.  Local Florida COOPs are activated on an 
annual basis, they require after-action reports which results in updated COOPs.   
The State of Florida cites the following objectives for a COOP: to ensure the 
safety of personnel and visitors; provide for the ability to continue essential operations; 
contain provisions for the protection of critical equipment, records, and other assets; 
maintain efforts to minimize damage and losses; contain provisions for an orderly 
response and recovery from any incident; serve as a foundation for the continued survival 
of leadership; assure compliance with legal and statutory requirements.59  In order to 
obtain these objectives Florida has cited the following essential elements for a COOP: 
plans and procedures; mission essential functions; delegations of authority; orders of 
succession; alternate facilities; interoperable communications; vital records and 
databases; logistics and administration; personnel issues and coordination; security; test, 
training and exercise; program management.60  Florida recognizes that these elements 
may overlap.  Florida gives COOP organization guidance by providing the following 
chapters: introduction, concept of operations, responsibilities and procedures, activation, 
alternate operations, reconstitution and termination.61 
4. Wisconsin 
Each county in Wisconsin should have in place a comprehensive and effective 
program to ensure the continuity of essential functions under all circumstances.  As a 
baseline of preparedness for the full range of potential emergencies, all county agencies 
should have in place a COOP/COG plan that ensures the performance of their essential 
functions during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations.62  A 
Wisconsin COOP must be maintained at a high level of readiness, be capable of 
implementation both with and without warning, be operational no later than 12 hours 
after activation, maintain sustained operations for up to 30 days and should take 
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maximum advantage of existing agency field infrastructures.63  Wisconsin gives COOP 
organization guidance by providing the following chapters: purpose, authorities, 
objectives, COOP/COG implementation, and the COOP/COG plan.64  
5. Ohio 
The State of Ohio COOP development and guidance was chosen because it has 
recently been developed and has a clear structure containing many of the necessary 
COOP elements previously identified.  Ohio has made a concerted effort to develop 
COOP guidance due to the Ohio Homeland Security Strategic Plan mandating all local 
jurisdictions to write a COOP.  Ohio’s COOP guidance used FPC 65, FEMA, LLIS and 
Maryland as resources in developing its template.  In addition the State of Ohio 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan county and city government agencies should ensure 
their hometown security plans and programs adequately address the needs of their 
communities.65 
Ohio advocates the first step to implementing a local COOP is laying the 
foundation.  For Norwalk, the COOP foundation can be found in Ohio’s COOP guidance 
propagated by the Ohio Emergency Management Agency.  Ohio’s COOP guidance is a 
five step process.  The first step includes: familiarize yourself and the COOP planning 
team with the concepts, information and sources of training underlying continuity of 
operations planning; identify or enact legal authorities for a COOP program; identify 
COOP reference documents; identify key players in the local COOP development; and 
conduct a risk assessment.66 
After these initial activities are conducted, the second step will be framing the 
COOP program.  The following activities must occur to properly frame the COOP: 
identify essential functions; identify key staff for performing essential functions and 
operations; determine delegations of authority; determine orders of succession; identify  
 
                                                 
63 Wisconsin Emergency Management, Operations Plan Guidance, 3. 
64 Ibid, 3-12. 
65 State of Ohio Security Task Force, Ohio Homeland Security Strategic Plan (Columbus, Ohio: State 
of Ohio, Department of Public Safety, 2004), 13. 
66 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan Guidance For 
Local Government (Columbus, Ohio: State of Ohio, 2005), 1-3. 
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alternate work location(s); identify vital records, documents and systems; identify 
communications assets for use during a “COOP event”; and identify mission critical 
systems.67 
The third step is putting the pieces together.  This step entails opening the Ohio 
COOP plan template starting with the executive summary then working through the full 
template using the guidance provided.68  During this step, the major effort will be 
incorporating all prior activities and their results into a single COOP document. 
Step four is implementing the developed COOP program.  COOP developers will 
ensure that all personnel are aware of the COOP plan and have knowledge of the portions 
of the plan that will affect them in the event the plan is activated.  A list of the emergency 
conditions, events and situations under which the COOP would be implemented will be 
developed.  In addition, COOP training and exercise will occur.69 
Finally, the COOP must be maintained.  A multi-year strategy must be developed 
with local leadership committing to maintaining the local COOP.70 
The development of local government COOPs in Ohio should build upon recently 
released (rough draft release September 2005) COOP template offered by the State of 
Ohio for local government COOP development.  Ohio’s COOP Template Instructions 
outlines the organization and content of the COOP plan and describe what it is, whom it 
affects, and the circumstances under which it should be executed.  Ohio’s COOP 
Template recommends the following chapters for a COOP: executive summary; 
introduction; purpose; applicability and scope; essential functions; authorities and 
references; concept of operations; COOP planning responsibilities; logistics; test, training 
and exercises; multi-year strategy and program management plan; and COOP Plan 
Maintenance.71 
 
                                                 
67 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations Guidance, 4-7. 
68 Ibid, 8-10. 
69 Ibid, 11-12. 
70 Ibid, 12-14. 
71 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan Template 
(Columbus, Ohio: State of Ohio, 2005), 1-11. 
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6. State Differences 
The guidance given by California, Maryland, Wisconsin and Ohio is based on 
federal documents and include common elements however there are some differences.  
California and Wisconsin recommend the COOP and COG be contained within the same 
document.  Florida specifically cites providing for an orderly response and recovery from 
any incident (all hazard approach) as a COOP objective.72  In addition Florida’s COOP 
does not include the ICS element or the photographs, charts, rosters and maps element.  
ICS is contained in Florida’s EOP and photographs, charts, rosters and maps are either 
contained in other identified COOP elements or are part of the EOP as well. 
Ohio’s COOP guidance does not contain the following COOP elements: COG, 
ICS, financial management, security measures, drive-away kits, after-action reports and 
staff/dependent care plans.  It is not clear why these elements were not included.  In 
addition, Ohio recommends a multi-year strategy and program management plan as part 
of its COOP guidance to include a review cycle table.73  Maryland does not specifically 
list either as one of its four basic functions.74  The COOP elements for each state will be 
collated in a subsequent chapter.   
E. LOCAL DOCUMENTS 
1. King County and Seattle, Washington 
The Region 6 Homeland Security Strategic Plan for King County, Washington 
includes the development of a COOP and links local government and private business.  
The strategic plan states the county will develop regional COOP/COG and business 
continuity plans (a COOP and business continuity plan appear to the be the same concept 
within this document using government and business as distinctions between the two 
terms); promote awareness of business continuity planning and its relationship to public 




                                                 
72 Florida Division of Emergency Management, COOP Coordinator – Orientation Session, 5. 
73 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan Template, 1-11. 
74 Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Maryland State Agencies: Preparing for an 
Emergency: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning for State Agencies, 1-15. 
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works; emphasize the critical role of information technology (IT) to business and 
government operations; focus on continuity of critical infrastructure services and key 
assets.75 
2. Huron County, Ohio 
Some state and county EOPs simply direct the local government subscribing to 
the EOP or strategic homeland security plan to develop their own specific COOP.  An 
example of this is Huron County, Ohio.  The COOP for Huron County, Ohio is in the 
county EOP and simple states: each department of Huron County government, and each 
city, village, and township and their departments are responsible for: (1) pre-designating 
lines of succession; (2) pre-delegating authorities for the successors to key personnel; (3) 
making provisions for the preservation of records; (4) developing procedures for the 
relocation of essential departments; (5) developing procedures to deploy essential 
personnel, equipment and supplies.  Each jurisdiction will include this information in its 
Standard Operating Guidelines.76  The Huron County COG is a separate from the COOP 
section within the EOP. 
3. Norwalk, Ohio 
Continuity of operation plans either do not exist for many small to medium local 
governments in Ohio or need to be updated.  For example, the City of Norwalk, Ohio is 
representative of the typical small to medium local jurisdiction in Ohio.  In 1964 the City 
of Norwalk developed a city wide comprehensive plan which does not include a 
continuity of operation plan.77  Norwalk’s comprehensive plan was not adopted by city 
council until 1972.  Since then, the Norwalk comprehensive plan has been reviewed 
periodically, but has not been updated with a COOP. 
F. LOCAL COOP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS  
Local government can initiate the COOP development process by requiring all 
local government department directors to write a COOP for their respective department 
that includes the identified compilation of COOP elements.  Once the department 
                                                 
75 King County, Washington, Region 6 Homeland Security Strategic Plan (Seattle, Washington: King 
County, Washington, December 2004), 16-17. 
76 Huron County Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operation Plan (Norwalk, Ohio: 
Huron County Emergency Management Agency , 2000), BP-26. 
77 Ladislas, Segoe & Associates, Norwalk Comprehensive Plan (Norwalk, Ohio: City of Norwalk, 
Ohio, Economic Development, 1965), 1-77. 
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COOPS are written, then a broader COOP can be developed incorporating the department 
COOPS.  A standard process can be followed by all department directors.  This thesis 
does not analyze the different COOP development process as offered by various states.  
However, the following Ohio COOP development process is similar to most states:  
• Familiarize yourself and the COOP planning team with the concepts, 
information and sources of training underlying continuity of operations 
planning;  
• Identify or enact legal authority(ies) for a COOP program (each 
department may have different legal authorities for example, EPA 
regulations for the water department would not apply to the finance 
department;  
• Identify COOP reference documents;  
• Identify key personnel in your agency/jurisdiction COOP;  
• Conduct a risk assessment;  
• Identify essential functions; 
• Identify key staff for performing essential functions and operations; 
determine delegations of authority;  
• Determine orders of succession;  
• Identify alternate work location(s);  
• Identify vital records, documents and systems;  
• Identify communications assets for use during a “COOP event”; identify 
mission critical systems;  
• Ensure that all personnel are aware of COOP plan and have knowledge of 
the portions of the plan that will affect them in the event the plan is 
activated;  
• Develop a list of the emergency conditions, events and situations under 
which the plan would be implemented; 
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•  Implement a COOP training program;  
• Exercise your COOP; and   
• Maintain a multi-year strategy and program for plan maintenance.78 
G. CONNECTING THE DOTS 
As evidenced in the literature review international, federal, state and limited local 
governments offer COOP guidance that may be applied to local jurisdictions in their 
COOP development.  A list of common as well as unique elements for each specific state 
will be compiled.  The remaining efforts of this thesis will be to collate the common and 
unique elements for the compilation of elements that should be included in a local COOP.   
                                                 
78 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Guidance for 
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IV.  COMMON, UNIQUE AND BEST PRACTICE COOP 
ELEMENTS 
A. SEVENTEEN REVIEWED COOP DOCUMENTS AND THEIR COOP 
ELEMENTS 
By collating COOP guidance from seventeen documents, common COOP 
elements were observed.  The seventeen documents reviewed and previously cited are as 
follows: 
1. Commonwealth of Australia, Emergency Planning Manual Number 43; 
2. Canada, Business Continuity Plan;  
3. Federal Preparedness Circular 65;  
4. Petersen’s Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: 
Background and Issues for Congress;  
5. General Services Administration’s Continuity of Operations Plan 2002; 
Release: 0111501V18.0.; 
6. National Strategy for Pandemic Flu; 
7. NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs, 2004 Edition;  
8. Transit Cooperative Research Program and National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program’s Continuity of Operation (COOP) Planning 
Guidelines for Transportation Agencies - TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 
525; 
9. Florida, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan Outline;  
10. Maryland State Agencies: Preparing for an Emergency: Continuity of 
Operations (COOP) Planning for State Agencies; 
11. Ohio Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Guidance for Local 
Government;   
12. Virginia, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning Manual, Version 1;  
13. Operations Plan Guidance, Wisconsin County Government Continuity of 
Operations (COOP)/Continuity of Government (COG);  
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14. California, Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of 
Operations (COOP) Emergency Planning Guidance for a Consolidated 
Approach;  
15. Santa Rosa County Continuity of Operations Plan;  
16. Pasco County Continuity of Operations Plan;  
17. Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan, Volume 1. 
The following table is the COOP element to document reviewed break down. 




 Australia Canada 
FPC 
65 Congress GAO Pandemic 
Purpose/Objective  X   X X 
COG       
Applicability and Scope  X   X X 
Sensitivity        
Authorities and References    X X X 
Plans and Procedures  X X X X X 
Classification and Responses X X X  X X 
Delegation of Authority   X X X X 
Orders of Succession   X X X X 
ICS       
Essential Functions  X X X X X 
Alternate Facilities  X X X X X 
Drive-Away Kits  X   X  
Interoperable Communications X X X X X X 
Vital Records, Databases and 
Systems    X X X X 
Financial Management X X   X  
Security Measures    X X  
Staff/Dependent Care Plans    X X X 
Photos, Charts, Rosters and Maps       
Tests, Training and Exercises X X X X X X 















1600 FL MD OH VA WI CA 
Purpose/Objective X X X  X X X X 
COG    X   X X 
Applicability and Scope  X X  X   X 
Sensitivity         
Authorities and References X X X  X  X X 
Plans and Procedures X X X X X X X X 
Classification and Responses X X X X X X X X 
Delegation of Authority X X X X X X X X 
Orders of Succession X X X X X X X X 
ICS         
Essential Functions X  X X X X X X 
Alternate Facilities X X X X X X X X 
Drive-Away Kits X  X   X    
Interoperable Communications X X X X X X X X 
Vital Records, Databases and 
Systems X X X X X X X X 
Financial Management X X     X  
Security Measures   X X     X 
Staff/Dependent Care Plans X  X X  X   
Photos, Charts, Rosters and Maps    X X    
Tests, Training and Exercises X X X X X X X X 
Plan Management/Maintenance X X X X X X X  
 
 Santa Rosa Pasco Co. Seattle 
Purpose/Objective  X X 
COG   X 
Applicability and Scope  X X 
Sensitivity    
Authorities and References   X 
Plans and Procedures X X X 
Classification and Responses X X X 
Delegation of Authority  X X 
Orders of Succession  X X 
ICS    
Essential Functions X X X 
Alternate Facilities X X X 
Drive-Away Kits X X  
Interoperable Communications  X  
Vital Records, Databases and 
Systems X X  
Financial Management   X 
Security Measures  X X 
Staff/Dependent Care Plans X X X 
Photos, Charts, Rosters and Maps X   
Tests, Training and Exercises X   
Plan Management/Maintenance  X  
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B. COOP ELEMENTS COMMON IN SEVENTEEN COOP DOCUMENTS 
The following COOP elements commonly appear in the listed documents, they 
are followed by the percentage of appearance. 
• Alternate Facilities, 94.1%; 
• Classification and Responses, 94.1%; 
• Procedural Language, 94.1%; 
• Essential Functions, 88.2%; 
• Purpose/Objective, 70.6%; 
• Interoperable Communications, 88.2%; 
• Tests, Training and Exercises, 88.2%; 
• Delegation of Authority, 82.4%; 
• Orders of Succession, 82.4%; 
• Vital Records and Databases, 82.4%; 
• Plan Management/Maintenance, 64.7%. 
• Authorities and References, 58.8%; 
• Personnel/Human Capital Language, 58.8%; 
• Applicability and Scope, 52.9%; 
As stated previously, the purpose of a COOP is to ensure the continuity of 
essential functions, yet this element was accounted for in 88.2% of the seventeen 
documents.  It is possible that this occurred due to definition problems or the inclusion of 
essential elements into an EOP.  This certainly appears to be the case for Australia. 
Well over 90% of the guidance reviewed called for a vulnerability study to be 
conducted regarding all hazard threats to the jurisdictions and/or facilities.  There appears 
to be a variety of ways to discuss the human capital element which appears to be in most 
guidance albeit under differing element titles.   
COOP phases such as activation, relocation, reconstitution or mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery and termination was considered part of the 
classification and response element.  The idea that COOP implementation occurs in 
phases is part of the concept of operations and appears to be integral to COOP 
development. 
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While the international examples did not match identified common COOP 
element language, they possess the elements under different language designation.  It 
appears FPC 65 is a driving force in domestic COOP development.  FPC 65 influence 
was observed in many of the examples by the identification of similar language.  
C. COOP ELEMENTS UNIQUE IN SOME COOP DOCUMENTS 
Using the same seventeen COOP guidance documents listed previously, a number 
of unique COOP elements are observed in some of the documents but not the majority of 
the documents.  These elements are followed by their percentage of occurrence are: 
• Financial Management, 41.2%; 
• Security Measures, 41.2%; 
• Drive-Away Kits, 41.2%; 
• COOP/COG Integration, 23.5%; 
• Photographs, Charts, Rosters and Maps, 17.6%. 
Including financial management and security measures in a COOP is good 
planning.  A COOP is activated during an all hazard event which means resources will be 
needed and purchased.  In addition, security concerns will always accompany an all 
hazard event.   
If there is devolution during an all hazard event with COOP activation, logic 
would dictate that continuity of government will be at risk as well.  COG, like COOP, is 
scalable dependent on the event and what local departments and jurisdictions are 
impacted.  Combing the COOP and COG concepts will facilitate a response leadership. 
Why photographs, charts, rosters and maps were not observed more often does 
not make much sense other than these items may be part of the overall EOP.  It is also 
possible that smaller jurisdictions do not believe they need to be included due to the 
COOP developers being intimately aware of their limited area, personnel and resources.  
Drive away kits are designed to aid personnel in the event of facility re-location.  
This would appear to be such a simple concept that it may have been overlooked by 




COOP Element Total Percentage 
Plans and Procedures 16 94.1% 
Classification and Responses 16 94.1% 
Alternate Facilities 16 94.1% 
Essential Functions 15 88.2% 
Interoperable Communications 15 88.2% 
Tests, Training and Exercises 15 88.2% 
Delegation of Authority 14 82.4% 
Orders of Succession 14 82.4% 
Vital Records, Databases and Systems 14 82.4% 
Purpose/Objective 12 70.6% 
Plan Management/Maintenance 11 64.7% 
Authorities and References 10 58.8% 
Staff/Dependent Care Plans 10 58.8% 
Applicability and Scope 9 52.9% 
Drive-Away Kits 7 41.2% 
Financial Management 7 41.2% 
Security Measures 7 41.2% 
COG 4 23.5% 
Photographs, Charts, Rosters and Maps 3 17.6% 
Sensitivity 0 0.0% 
ICS 0 0.0% 
Table 3. Collated COOP Elements 
 
D. LLIS COOP ELEMENT BEST PRACTICE 
According to the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) website, the basic 
COOP plan itself will include key elements such as the identification of essential 
functions, delegation of authorities, order of succession, protection of vital documents 
and systems, alternate operating locations, communications plans, and a plan for tests, 
training, and exercises.  According to LLIS, each agency must develop a response plan 
that details the initiation, implementation, and termination of the COOP plan.79   
LLIS considers these COOP elements a best practice.  This best practice 
document describes several aspects of COOP plans; many templates exist for adaptation 
in an individual agency or jurisdiction.  Although templates are useful for mapping out 
the COOP plan, many continuity planners recommend against relying too heavily on  
 
 
                                                 
79 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "State And Local Continuity of Operations Planning: 
Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," www.LLIS.gov/ (accessed November 16, 2005), 1-6. 
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outlines, worksheets, and templates.  It is important for jurisdictions and agencies to 
“own” the COOP process by participating in the actual planning and development of the 
plan.80 
LLIS recommends the following section headings as elements of any COOP plan.  
The percentage of occurrence in the seventeen documents is included. 
• Alternate Operating Locations and Facilities, 94.1%; 
• COOP Implementation and Plans, 94.1% 
• Classifications of Emergencies and COOP Responses, 94.1%; 
• Identification of Essential Functions and Critical Services, 88.2%; 
• Tests, Training and Exercises, 88.2%; 
• Protection of Vital Records, Databases and Systems, 82.4%; 
• Delegation of Authority to Key Personnel, 82.4%; 
• Orders of Succession for Key Personnel, 82.4% 
• Purpose/Objective, 70.6%; 
• Authorities and References, 58.8%; 
• Staff/Dependent Care Plans, 58.8%. 
• Applicability and Scope, 52.9%; 
• Sensitivity, 0%; 
• Incident Command System, 0%; 
What is fascinating about the LLIS recommendations of COOP elements are the 
two elements that were never observed; sensitivity and ICS.  Sensitivity is the public 
record classification of the COOP.  A COOP discusses sensitive topics related to a 
government’s emergency response, including information on vulnerabilities.  Distribution 
should be limited to government employees and support personnel.  The COOP plan 
should be designated as “for official use only” or something similar.  Planners should 
consult with legal counsel regarding issues related to freedom of information 
requirements and sunshine law issues.81  Florida has a state statute making their COOPs 
not a public record.  The federal government has a similar law.  This probably accounts 
for the lack of sensitivity language within the COOP.   
                                                 
80 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
81 Ibid. 
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NIMS and ICS are normally covered under an EOP which the COOP is a part of.  
This accounts for the lack of ICS language.  With this zero percent result, it is unclear 
why LLIS would recommend ICS be part of a COOP as a best practice.  Although 
including ICS in a COOP would be advisable in case the person in charge of activating 
the COOP does not have access to the EOP as well.   
An interesting aspect of the LLIS best practice for COOP elements is a published 
disclaimer in the document.  The disclaimer states “The LLIS website and its contents are 
provided for informational purposes only and do not represent the official position of the 
US Department of Homeland Security or the National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and are provided without warranty or guarantee of any 
kind.”82  Fascinating that COOP guidance is offered with the best practice defined yet 
responsibility is deferred by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  One could 
conclude that the best practice is an intuitive guess but nothing more.  However, LLIS 
purports best practice resources are peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or 
solutions that work and are solidly grounded upon actual experience in operations, 
training, and exercises.83   
It should be noted the two documents that are referenced the most throughout the 
best practice document is the General Services Administration (GSA) COOP plan 
template and the Maryland State Agencies COOP Planning Manual.  How often have 
GSA and Maryland agencies implemented their COOPs in an all hazard event in order to 
establish the best practice? 
                                                 
82 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
83 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Best Practice Resources," www.LLIS.gov/ (accessed 
July 26, 2006). 
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V. IDENTIFIED COMPILATION OF COOP ELEMENTS 
By analyzing the common, unique and LLIS best practice COOP elements a 
compilation of COOP elements is easily identified.  The following is the identified 
compilation of COOP elements that should be used when developing a COOP. 
A. PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE 
This section states the purpose or objective of the COOP plan.  The section should 
clearly indicate that the plan seeks to maintain only critical services during an all hazard 
event.  For example LLIS recommends: “This COOP provides guidance for, and 
facilitates the preparation of, site- or activity-specific plans and procedures that help 
ensure the safety of personnel at the alternate facility and allow organizational elements 
to continue essential operations in the event of an emergency or threat of an emergency.  
The planning guidance and the plans to be developed in accordance with it do not address 
day-to-day activities that enable an organization to conduct or safeguard routine 
operations.”84 
B. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 
Continuity of Government has been defined as the preservation, maintenance, or 
reconstitution of the civil government's ability to carry out its constitutional 
responsibilities.  Continuity of government is concerned with the full range of 
governmental services including the three branches of government (judicial, legislative, 
and executive) and all levels of government (federal, state, and local).85  Continuity of 
operations is a planning concept that focuses on government’s ability to continue 
essential functions.  While these two concepts can be delineated, they are functionally 
similar for COOP leadership during activation.  In fact FEMA recognizes and encourages 
the consolidation of the COG/COOP concepts.  LLIS recommends COG/COOP 
consolidation as a best practice.86  A COG can be an element of the COOP or a stand 
                                                 
84 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of A Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
85 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of 
Operations (COOP) Emergency Planning Guidance For a Consolidated Approach, Best Practice" 
www.LLIS.gov/ (accessed November 16, 2005). 
86 Ibid. 
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alone document.  According to research, COG is not the purpose of the COOP however 
COG may be necessary for COOP leadership during activation. 
C. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE 
This section describes who and what the plan applies to, under what 
circumstances, and with what limitations.  Example: “The provisions of this COOP are 
applicable to all [Insert agency name] personnel located at [Insert your agency address 
and include your zip code].  This plan is applicable to the full spectrum of man-made, 
natural, and technological emergencies and threats, with the exception of civil defense 
matters, which are addressed in other documentation.”87 
D. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 
The COOP plan must list state and local ordinances and statutes that affect 
government, emergency, and continuity planning, such as the state emergency 
management acts, local emergency operations plans, authorizing laws and executive 
decisions, etc.  This section refers future readers to relevant plans and authorizing 
documents.88 
E. COOP IMPLEMENTATION PLANS  
COOP Implementation Plans - agencies must prepare plans for implementing 
each element of the COOP plan throughout the period of disruption, from initial 
activation to final reconstitution.89  COOP implementation can consist of: mitigation, 
preparedness, activation, devolution, relocation, response, recovery, reconstitution and 
termination of the COOP after reconstitution. 
F. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES AND COOP RESPONSES 
Many of the incidents requiring COOP implementation will be small in scale and 
occur frequently.  Agencies should define the severity of emergencies and tailor the level 
of COOP plan implementation to meet their needs.  The Maryland State Agencies COOP 
Planning Manual classifies emergencies in one of five categories, listed in the table 
below.  Class /Level of Emergency I, disruption of up to 12 hours, with little effect on 
services or impact to essential functions or critical systems.  No COOP activation 
required, depending on individual agency requirements.  Class/Level of Emergency II, 
                                                 




disruption of 12 to 72 hours, with minor impact on essential functions.  Class II involves 
a limited COOP activation dependent on individual agency requirements.  Class/Level of 
Emergency III, disruption to one or two essential functions or to a vital system for no 
more than three days.  A Class III may require movement of some personnel to an 
alternate work site or location in the primary facility for less than a week.  Class/Level of 
Emergency IV, disruption to one or two essential functions or to the entire agency with 
potential of lasting for more than three days but less than fourteen days.  A Class IV may 
require activation of orders of succession for some key personnel and may require 
movement of some personnel to an alternate work site or location in the primary facility 
for more than a week.  Lastly, Class/Level of Emergency V Disruption to the entire 
agency with a potential for lasting at least fourteen days.  A Class V requires activation of 
orders of succession for some key personnel and requires movement of many, if not all 
personnel, to an alternate work site for more than fourteen days.90 
G. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO KEY PERSONNEL 
The authority to make key emergency decisions during a COOP event must be 
clear and compliant with state and local law.  COOP plans must delineate and limit the 
authority that key COOP personnel will have during an event.  
H. ORDERS OF SUCCESSION FOR KEY PERSONNEL 
The loss of an agency or department head and others in key positions requires 
detailed orders of succession.91 
I. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
The Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) should be incorporated into COOP planning if possible.  ICS describes 
the structure for command and control of the emergency and should be used when the 
COOP plan is activated.92  While this collated to zero percent, ICS is an integral part of 
COOP leadership and should be included in a COOP.  It is part of command and control.   
 
 
                                                 
90 Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Maryland State Agencies: Preparing for an 
Emergency: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning for State Agencies, 73. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
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ICS is part of the EOP which COOP is a subset of however including ICS as a COOP 
element serves as a reminder for the person activating the COOP to make sure they are 
using ICS. 
J. IDENTIFICATION OF ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS AND CRITICAL 
SERVICES 
Every COOP plan must delineate the essential functions, services, and activities 
carried out by the agency. The plan must also identify the personnel, facilities, and 
resources required for each function or service.93 
K. ALTERNATING OPERATING LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES, TO 
INCLUDE DRIVE-AWAY KITS 
The loss of a primary operating facility must be accounted for in a COOP plan.  A 
plan should identify alternate facilities that enable the agency to re-establish critical 
services within 12 hours following the loss of the primary facility.94  The alternate 
facility must be able to support critical mission systems.   
While alternate facilities have been identified as a common COOP element, Pasco 
County, Florida included in their COOP a description of drive-away kits for their 
personnel to pack and go.  The drive-away kit can consist of simple things like office 
supplies, small office equipment, copies of policies, plans and procedures.  This simple 
concept is critical to making an alternate facility productive in a quick manner. 
L. INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications systems should be able to support an agency’s essential 
functions and internal/external communications during a COOP implementation.  The 
communications component of a COOP plan should identify protective measures for 
critical communications systems, establish backup systems, and detail contact lists for 
key personnel.95  There is the possibility that an incident may take away day-to-day 
communication systems and methods.  If it becomes necessary to occupy the alternate 
                                                 
93 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "State And Local Continuity of Operations Planning: 
Communications," www.LLIS.gov/, (accessed November 16, 2005).  
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work location it will be necessary to ensure that communications systems are in place so 
that essential operations can continue unabated.96 
M. VITAL RECORDS, DATABASES AND SYSTEMS 
In order to maintain critical services to the public, government agencies must 
protect the vital records, documents, databases, and information systems that support the 
agency’s essential functions. Agencies should create a records management system that 
protects vital documents and systems in an emergency.97 
N. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
Another unique COOP element is financial management or financial 
administration.  In any COOP activation, finances become a critical issue within a few 
hours as expendable resources are used up and labor costs mount.  It makes sense to 
incorporate in the COOP guidelines on financial management during activation.  
Anymore, financing is occurring electronically.  The loss of power occurs in many all 
hazard events.  Having a plan in place to ensure purchasing and expenditures is critical.  
In fact, for FEMA reimbursement, exact documentation is required. 
O. SECURITY MEASURES FOR PERSONNEL, RECORDS, ALTERNATE 
FACILITIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT RESOURCES 
A COOP element found in the research was security measures for personnel, 
records and alternate facilities or protection of government resources, facilities and 
personnel.  For example, Pasco County, Florida uses the following language: “will be 
provided at the primary facility in a lock down to protect remaining infrastructure as 
applicable.  Security will be provided at the alternate facility location to ensure staff 
safety and a secure means of ingress and egress.  During COOP activation a County 
employee will control access to the primary and/or alternate facility.”  A security 
provision should be included in COOP development.  Given that the COOP will be 
activated during an all hazard event which could easily mean the hazard poses an 
immediate threat to resources, facilities and personnel, ensuring security measures are 
taken will lend itself to the continuity of operation.  It was surprising not to observe this 
element in more of the documents. 
                                                 
96 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan Guidance for 
Local Governments, 6. 
97 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity Of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
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P. STAFF/DEPENDENT CARE PLANS TO INCLUDE PERSONAL 
PREPAREDNESS, TRANSPORTATION, LODGING AND FOOD 
Staff/Dependent Care Plans - the protection of personnel and their families is of 
paramount importance.  Employees are unlikely to work at an alternate location for an 
extended period of time if their family is in danger.  COOP plans should work out 
programs for shelter of dependents during relocation at the alternate location or a nearby 
facility.98  According to Pasco County, Florida, personnel should have “go-kits” 
(preparation kits) for utilization during activation with the following items available, if 
necessary:  
• Changes of clothing; 
• Daily medication requirements or medical equipment required; 
• Personal hygiene items; 
• Identification (driver’s license, county id badge, fuel card); 
• Rain gear, boots, gloves, vests, and other PPE provided by the department; 
• Enough food and water for up to three days; 
• Sleeping gear; 
• Cash; 
• Appropriate arrangements for family issues; 
• Contact Lists; 
• Special dietary needs.99 
Another critical concern in COOP personnel management is the loss, 
unavailability and relief of personnel during an all hazard event.  Plans should be made 
for staff augmentation with the knowledge that mutual aid can be requested.  Note, the 
timeliness of local, state and federal personnel will vary based on the breadth of the all 
hazard event.   
Having personal needs met assists in personnel morale.  Personal plans should 
include a plan for the employee’s family so the employee can be assured their family is 
being taken care of during an all hazard event.  A lesson learned from New Orleans was 
                                                 
98 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
99 Pasco County Office of Emergency Management, Pasco County Continuity of Operations Plan 
(New Port Richey, FL: Pasco County, 2004), 20. 
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many of the first responders did not have personal plans for their family and became 
more concerned with taking care of their family rather than performing their job.100  
Q. PHOTOGRAPHS, CHARTS, ROSTERS AND MAPS 
Santa Rosa, Florida included photographs, charts, rosters and maps in their 
COOP.  While the Santa Rosa COOP did not offer rationale for the inclusion of this 
element, it appears the element was included to provide personnel resources for COOP 
activation and response.101 
R. TESTS, TRAINING AND EXERCISE 
Familiarity with COOP plans and procedures can be fostered through tests, 
orientation, training, table-top exercises, and full-scale exercises.  Agency employees 
must participate in training and exercises to familiarize themselves with emergency 
procedures and their role in COOP response.102 
S. PLAN MANAGEMENT/MAINTENANCE TO INCLUDE AFTER-
ACTION REPORTS 
The organization structures of local governments/jurisdictions change over time, 
as do the functions assigned to specific agencies.  To ensure that COOP plans always 
reflect current organization conditions, they should be reviewed as part of the training 
and exercise program.  Changes in an agency’s organization structure, function or 
mission, and service to clients should be made to the plan as they occur.103 
A number of documents included after-action reports as part of their COOP 
maintenance element.  It is critical that after-action reports become a part of a COOP for 
two very important reasons; the after-action report memorializes COOP effectiveness for 
historical/research purposes and it is a mechanism to learn what worked well and what 
did not.  A revised COOP can result from after-action reports.  For example, in 2004 
Valusia County, Florida was hit by three hurricanes and their COOP played a vital role in 
the continued provision of government essential functions.  The Valusia County after-
action report identified a number of lessons learned or areas of improvement directly 
                                                 
100Pasco County Office of Emergency Management, Pasco County Continuity of Operations Plan 
(New Port Richey, FL: Pasco County, 2004), 19-20. 
101 Santa Rosa, Florida, Santa Rosa County Continuity of Operations Plan 5-6. 
102 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005, "Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan," 1-6. 
103 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Ohio Continuity of Operations Guidance, 12. 
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related to their local COOP as outlined in the literature review.  Another example is New 
York City, after the August 14, 2003 power outage.  The after action assessment resulted 






















VI. IDENTIFIED COMPILATION OF COOP ELEMENTS IN 
TEMPLATE FORM 
Thus far, this thesis has examined seventeen COOP guidance documents in order 
to identify the COOP elements that should be contained in a COOP.  A COOP template 
should contain the identified compilation of COOP elements.  The utility of a COOP 
template is to give common structure and format for those who use them.  The 
development of COOP elements need to reflect local ownership.  The template presented 
in this thesis represents the identified compilation of COOP elements.  It has been 
developed by utilizing the seventeen COOP guidance documents with a strong Florida 
and Ohio influence for structure and format.   
RECOMMENDED TEMPLATE 
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES  
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE 
1. Classification of Emergencies Based on Vulnerability Assessment 
Vet with EOP. 
2. COOP Integration with Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) 
C. ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 







Table 4. Essential Functions 
 




4. COOP Source Documents 
E. LEADERSHIP: COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. Continuity of Government (COG) 
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Vet with EOP. 






Table 5. Order of Succession 
 
3. Delegation of Authority 
4. Incident Command System 
Vet with EOP. 
F. COOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN  
1. Phase 1 – Activation and Relocation 
a. Devolution 
The devolution section should address how an organization will identify 
and conduct its essential functions in the aftermath of a worst-case scenario, one in which 
the leadership is incapacitated.  The organization should be prepared to transfer all of 
their essential functions and responsibilities to personnel at a different office or location. 
b. Decision Making Process, Initial Actions 
c. Alternate Facility Identification 
List more than one option based on the ability to sustain Mission Critical 
Systems. 
d. Alert, Notification and Implementation Process 
e. Hours of Operation 
2. Phase 2 – Alternate Facility Operation 
a. Mission Critical Systems 
System Name Current Location Other Locations 
   
   
   






b. Vital Records and Databases 












Backed up at 
Third 
Location 
     
     
     
     
     
Table 7. Vital Records and Databases 
 
c. Interoperable Communications 
(1) Radio 
(2) Telecommunications 
(3) Information Technology 
d. Security 
(1) Physical Facility 
(2) Access Control 
(3) Personnel 
(4) Communication 
e. Financial Management 
f. Pre Positioned Resources 
g. Drive Away Kits 
3. Phase 3 – Reconstitution Procedures 
G. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
1. Roster and Contact Information 
2. Key Contingency Staff Responsibilities 
3. Staff Augmentation, Mutual Aid 
4. Transportation, Food and Lodging 
5. Staff Personal Preparedness 
To include a personal preparation kit for COOP activation. 
6. Preparedness for Dependents of Staff 
To include a family plan in case of emergency and a family emergency plan kit. 
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H. PLAN MANAGEMENT 
1. Planning Responsibilities 
2. Test, Training and Exercise 
3. Multi Year Strategy 
4. After-Action Reports 
5. Remedial Action Plans 
I. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 
1. Operational Checklists 
2. Maps, Charts and Photographs 
3. Evacuation Routes 
Vet with EOP. 
4. Appendices 
a. Definitions 
b. Media Plan 
c. Vendor and Special Equipment List 
d. Local EOP 
e. Related COOPS 
To include departments within the local jurisdiction and mutual supporting 
partners.   
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VII. BARRIERS AND ANSWERS TO COOP DEVELOPMENT 
As mentioned previously, it is important for jurisdiction and agencies to “own” 
the COOP process by participating in the actual planning and development of the plan.104  
There are barriers to COOP development.  Some of the barriers are lack of interest, lack 
of COOP development leadership, COOP topic too vast “lose sight of the forest through 
the trees,” an all hazard event prior to COOP development/implementation (pandemic flu 
or tornado) or shelving the finished COOP and not train on COOP activation (New 
Orleans Example). 
Another common barrier is the assumption by local leaders that an all hazard 
event is a low probability therefore COOP development can wait or becomes a low 
priority.  The problem that can occur is an all hazard event could occur in the local 
jurisdiction and without a COOP the local jurisdiction would not be prepared to continue 
its essential functions during the event.  While an all hazard event for a local jurisdictions 
may be a low probability, having a developed COOP will have a high payoff should the 
event occur. 
According to Eric R. Petersen who authored Continuity of Operations (COOP) in 
the Executive Branch: Background and Issues for Congress, executive branch COOP 
planning raise several questions related to underlying policy matters.  Some of these 
questions include: what is the general level of preparedness to carry out COOP plans; 
which agencies have established effective COOP programs; have those plans been 
evaluated; by what organizations; because COOP plans are typically customized to 
preserve an agency’s unique operational needs, how can effective COOP planning be 
evaluated; what are the costs of establishing offsite facilities for use as emergency 
offices, alternate computing facilities, or securing office equipment and supplies in an 
emergency; and has FEMA been effective in supporting agencies as they develop their 
COOP plans?105 
                                                 
104 LLIS State and Local Government Continuity of Operations Planning: Developing a Continuity of 
Operations Plan, Best Practice Website, 1-4. 
105 Petersen, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Background and Issues for 
Congress, 11. 
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COOP planners emphasize the importance of receiving support or endorsement 
for the process from elected officials, chief executives, and agency heads.  When agency 
leaders are supportive of the process, COOP plans tend to be more complete and 
effective.  When the chief elected official in a jurisdiction supports COOP planning, for 
example, overall participation is wider.  Ideally, an executive order requiring cooperation 
with COOP planners will be the most effective way to ensure agency participation.  Short 
of an executive order, a letter from the chief elected official can also be effective in 
eliciting support for COOP planning.  Committed and strong leadership to the COOP 
development process must occur.  Leadership must follow through on checking the 
progress of COOP development as well.  Continuity planners should educate elected 
officials and chief executives on the importance of COOP planning in order to receive 
executive buy-in.106  
COOP planners should develop an executive plan that identifies the goals of 
COOP planning and sets a path for achieving them.  This executive plan serves as a 
roadmap for each organization that will develop COOP plans, who will serve on the key 
development teams, how will agency data be collected, etc.107   
At the outset of COOP plan development, planners should create an orientation 
program to educate agencies on continuity concepts.  Many agency employees, including 
department and agency heads, will know very little about the purpose, structure, and need 
for COOP planning.  A program to familiarize these stakeholders with COOP can include 
group discussions, presentations, and handouts.  Some COOP planners have noted the 
effectiveness of scenario-based training.  COOP planners should present a common 
emergency situation and ask stakeholders how they would maintain essential functions.  
A more formal program for tests, training, and exercises is usually developed later in the 
planning process.108 
Executive leadership coupled with an orientation program designed to educate on 
continuity concepts is imperative for COOP designers to include the compilation of 
COOP elements identified in this thesis and to be able to follow or at least have access to 
                                                 




COOP templates that have been implemented in other jurisdictions.  The compilation of 
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VIII. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATION 
There are a number of policy implications that can be recommended from COOP 
document analysis.  The policy implications should be used by COOP developers and for 
further COOP research.  This is not to suggest that this is an all inclusive list of policy 
implications, rather, it is a list that was developed for this particular body of work. 
A. UTILIZE IDENTIFIED COMPILATION OF COOP ELEMENTS IN 
COOP DEVELOPMENT 
It is clear that COOP elements have been added by various states or local 
jurisdictions to FPC 65, which served as the base federal COOP document.  For example, 
LLIS included ICS and sensitivity in its COOP elements best practice.  In the report to 
Congress, security was added as an element.  Authorities and references were added in 
other COOP guidance documents.  Since 2002, other COOP elements were added as 
COOP development evolved.  By analyzing the identified Common, Unique and Best 
Practice COOP Elements a COOP element compilation is easily identified.  COOP 
elements should consist of: 
• Purpose/Objective; 
• Continuity of Government; 
• Applicability and Scope; 
• Authorities and References; 
• COOP Implementation Plans and Procedures (mitigation, preparedness, 
devolution, response, recovery/reconstitution and termination); 
• Classification of Emergencies and COOP Responses; 
• Delegation of Authority to Key Personnel; 
• Orders of Succession for Key Personnel; 
• Incident Command System; 
• Identification of Essential Functions and Critical Services; 
• Alternate Operating Locations and Facilities, to include drive-away kits; 
• Interoperable Communications; 
• Vital Records, Databases, and Systems; 
• Financial Management; 
56 
• Security Measures for Personnel, Records and Alternate Facilities or 
Protection of Government Resources; 
• Staff/Dependent Care Plans (to include personal preparedness 
transportation, lodging and food); 
• Photographs, Charts, Rosters and Maps; 
• Tests, Training, and Exercise; 
• Plan Management/Maintenance to include after-action reports. 
This compilation of COOP elements can become part of the 2006 Nationwide 
Plan Review Phase 2 Report federal government’s desired outcome for Goal #24: 
creation of a performance management framework that tracks performance against 
standard capabilities and tasks as reflected in synchronized plans across levels of 
government to include continuity of operations and government as a priority performance 
measure.109 
B. INCORPORATE THE COMPILATION OF COOP ELEMENTS INTO 
COOP TEMPLATES FOR STRUCTURE AND FORMAT 
As previously noted, COOP templates should not be relied on to heavily and 
COOP developers should “own” the process, making the COOP specific for the local 
jurisdiction.  The two templates presented; Florida and the modified Ohio; offer the 
necessary structure and format and incorporate the majority of the compilation of COOP 
elements.   
By relying too heavily on other COOP templates, some elements may not be 
included.  For example, the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report specifically 
identifies NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs as a source document for a COOP template.  Interestingly, NFPA 
1600 does not list the COOP element of essential functions for development.  The 
purpose for a COOP is to ensure the continuity of essential functions.  While the NFPA 
1600 does a good job with most other elements, reliance solely on this document could 
lead to missing the whole point of a COOP. 
Florida’s COOP template is the most comprehensive.  The best part of the Florida 
COOP template is it has been the basis of local COOP development in Florida since 
2002.  Florida is known for its hurricane season and local entities have pragmatically                                                  
109 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 78. 
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exercised their COOPs in an all hazard event.  In fact, Florida was rated by the DHS in 
2006 as a “bright spot” receiving “Sufficient” – the highest rating given for states with 
response plans.  Florida, accustomed to being whipped with hurricane winds, was the 
only state assessed as ready in all nine categories of catastrophe planning.110  Florida’s 
COOP template has practical utility. 
C. COOP AFTER-ACTION REPORTS 
An after-action report is a review process that details what happened, why it 
happened and how can it be done better.  An AAR is about learning, not about finger 
pointing or even fixing a problem.111  Conducting AAR’s should be conducted with the 
focus of improving a process, policy and/or procedure.  AAR’s can be conducted as part 
of external and/or internal evaluations.  Requiring an AAR in a COOP will assist in a 
COOP review focused on improving the COOP and with the goal of getting better at 
executing the COOP during an all hazard event.  Many lessons are learned through 
COOP AARs as evidenced in this thesis.  The example of New Orleans, New York and 
Volusia County provide valuable COOP direction.  Furthermore, AAR’s will provide a 
valuable resource for COOP research as the AAR’s become available.    
D. FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDED 
Since 2001, COOP guidance and development has progressed significantly.  In 
fact, many of our federal and state homeland security strategies call for local COOP 
development with most stating it is a “good business practice.”  The COOP guidance that 
has been offered centers around identified COOP elements and to a certain extent COOP 
templates containing the identified COOP elements.  The list of COOP elements 
intuitively makes sense and many jurisdictions have built their COOPs upon them. 
Almost all the COOP guidance available is government driven or authored.  There 
is some guidance for private enterprise.  What is lacking is academic COOP literature.  
During the research portion of this thesis, the lack of academic COOP literature was 
readily apparent from the onset.  This is not to suggest that the COOP guidance is wrong 
or misdirected but how do we know that it is effective?  The best practice identified by 
LLIS is strongly linked to federal and Maryland COOP guidance.  How often has the                                                  
110 Lara Jakes Jordan, "Cities Not Prepared for Disaster," Associated Press, June 16 2006, 1. 
111 Wikipedia, October 2005, "After-action Review," 
http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Action_Review/ (accessed July 15, 2006). 
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federal General Services Administration or Maryland used its COOPs in an all hazard 
event?  Are there after action reports available?  Were the COOPs effective.  How did 
this become the best practice?  These same questions can be asked of Florida which 
probably has the most long term experience in an all hazard event where a local COOP 
was utilized.  Certainly Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide opportunity for COOP 
research and the development of academic literature.  California has listed six large all 
hazard events that have driven COOP development as well, but where is the research?  
Could it be that COOPs did not exist for these all hazard events or has the research just 
not been undertaken? 
While the identified COOP elements appear to be intuitively sound, where is the 
qualitative or quantitative analysis that they are effective?  Qualitatively or quantitatively 
identifying the effectiveness of COOP elements should be researched by academia.  
Failure for this research to occur means that COOP development will continue on an 
intuitive level.  The best analogy is driving a car to a certain location.  Intuitively the 
driver may turn left when right or going straight was correct.  A road map and/or 
compass will keep the driver going in the right direction to reach the intended destination.  
Academic COOP research will serve as the map and/or compass.   
The COOP foundation needs to be strengthened through research because the 
COOP purpose of local government ensuring essential functions during an all hazard 
event is critical to the devolution, response and recovery effort.  Certainly, one cannot 
claim identifying an effective COOP is not important to our nation, state or local 
government. 
From an academic perspective, focused research can improve our understanding 
of how to make lesson learning work well.  Immediate research opportunities include 
more rigorous textual and content analysis of the after-action reports to validate our 
suggestive findings, to identify causal processes understanding of which may enhance 
learning, and to understand the differences in perspectives that emerge across different 
agencies that participate in the same incident.  Researchers should bring the learning 
science and social psychology literature to bear on developing approaches the effective 
learning tailored to the challenges of preparedness and emergency response.  In short, 
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helping organizations navigate the complexities of lessons learning should be informed 
by the substantial academic literature that has developed around this issue.112 
To date, it is unclear why academia has not undertaken this research.  With the 
advent of multiple homeland security academic programs at the college and university 
level, many students and professors will be considering research options.  Qualitatively or 
quantitatively identifying effective COOPs and their elements should be undertaken.  In 
addition, this research should be funded by DHS or a private enterprise. 
                                                 
112 Amy K. Donahue, "Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We 
Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them," Homeland Security Affairs: The Journal of the Naval 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
A continuity of operations plan (COOP) facilitates the performance of essential 
functions during an emergency situation that disrupts normal operations, and it provides 
for the resumption of normal operations once the emergency has ended.  National and 
state homeland security strategies call for local COOP development.  In fact, the 2006 
Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report identifies COOP development as a state and 
local goal with a federal goal of providing COOP development support.  Currently, 
COOP guidance is provided by various international, federal, state and local government 
documents and by collating these guidance documents a compilation of common, unique 
and best practice COOP elements are identified.  The identified compilation of COOP 
element should be contained in a COOP and a COOP template is presented containing 
these elements.  The recommended template is designed to provide structure and form 
however local government must independently develop and “own” their COOP by 
defining the compilation of COOP elements for their jurisdiction.  By incorporating the 
same identified COOP elements, continuity of operation plans would be similar and fuse 
with other local continuity of operation plans within the state or region.  It is 
recommended the identified compilation of COOP elements can become part of the 2006 
Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report federal government’s desired outcome for Goal 
#24: “creation of a performance management framework that tracks performance against 
standard capabilities and tasks as reflected in synchronized plans across levels of 
government to include continuity of operations and government as a priority performance 
measure.”113 
It is important to note that an after action-report is a necessary component for 
COOP maintenance and can be used for COOP research.  COOP guidance is being driven 
by government documents and lessons learned from government after-action reports 
while COOP development and academic research regarding the effectiveness for existing 
plans is non existent.  Independent research and review is necessary to strengthen 
government’s direction in COOP development.  Academia must pursue COOP research 
too qualitatively and quantitatively, dependent on the appropriate research method as 
                                                 
113 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report, 78. 
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determined by the researcher, identify effective COOPs and their respective elements. 
With the advent of homeland security as an academic pursuit, opportunity for COOP 
research exists and should be federally funded due to the critical nature of an effective 
COOP for local government in ensuring the continuity of essential functions during an all 
hazard event. 
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